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1 Over  the  past  few  years,  common
interpretations  of  the  Chinese  economy
propounded in the West have undergone a
shift  of  emphasis.  Until  quite  recently,
most  media  discourse  and  scholarly
analysis  were,  at  bottom,  a  variation on
the theme of liberalisation. The focus was
laid  on  China’s  societal  transformation
from socialism to a fully-fledged capitalist
order,  or  in  other  words,  on  the
deepening  of  the  country’s  market
transition. The validity and usefulness of
such a perspective is hard to contest, and
yet,  as  a  prism  through  which  to
understand  the  present-day  Chinese
political  economy,  the  notion  of
liberalisation has become overly obvious,
if  not  a  shade  simplistic.  In  effect,  the
market  transition  paradigm  is  being
increasingly  displaced  in  favour  of  its
mirror  image,  namely  an  all-out
insistence on the dirigisme of the Chinese
state,  ranging  from  state-owned  enterprises  (SOEs)  to  capital  allocation,  from  the
renminbi regime to industrial subsidies.
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2 The eerie resilience (so far) of the Chinese economy in the face of the worst global crisis
since the Great Depression, combined with the inexorable ascent of China’s top SOEs in
the Forbes and Fortune international corporate rankings, have triggered no little soul-
searching on Western shores. In 2010, Ian Bremmer’s shocker book The End of the Free
Market warned the American public of a global clash between the “market capitalism”
of the West and the “state capitalism” of a handful of developing nations, among which
China stood as primus inter pares. Bremmer’s ideas, as unsubtle as they are incisive, have
been liberally  relayed in  the mainstream economic press.  To many ears,  the terms
“state capitalism” and “China” have now become a natural pair.
3 Have we simply witnessed the substitution of one stereotype for another? Probably.
And yet, under the veneer of overused labels, essential issues are raised: how does the
peculiar  interpenetration  of  politics  and  economics  in  the  PRC  distinguish  it  from
developed  Western  nations  as  well  as  from  other  post-socialist  and  emerging
countries? How is it possible to discern the durable from the transitional among the
constituent  traits  of  China’s  economic  statism?  In  sum,  how  do  we  elucidate  the
differentia specifica of the Chinese political economy?
4 In this connection, Marie-Claire Bergère’s decision to focus her latest work on the role
of the state in the Chinese economy is most timely. As smooth as it is knowledgeable,
Chine:  le  nouveau  capitalisme  d’État embraces  the  thesis  of  state  capitalism  as  its
departure  point.  It  then  goes  on  to  explore  a  number  of  other  aspects  of  Chinese
society, surveyed through the lens of the CCP’s overarching dominance in the realms of
economics, politics, and ideology.
5 The introduction, aptly titled “The end of illusions,” sets the tone:  to presuppose a
spontaneous tendency towards economic or political liberalisation in China “implies a
kind of determinism as thorough as in the Marxist schema” (p.  11).  The book then
proposes a short retrospective sketch of three decades of Reform and Opening (Chapter
1),  followed  by  a  description  of  the  central  workings  of  China’s  current  “state
capitalism” (Chapter 2). Bergère insists in particular on the “national champions,” the
central-level  firms nominally  under  the  control  of  SASAC,1 as  well  as  on the  rapid
expansion of state-funded investment in the wake of the 2008 stimulus plan, a trend
often referred to in China as 国进民退 (guo jin min tui, “the state advances, the private
retreats”).  Chapters  3  and  4  address  the  situation  of  the  Chinese  domestic  private
sector,  a  terrain  very  familiar  to  Bergère.  The  diverse,  fragmented,  and  usually
subaltern world of private entrepreneurs is sharply rendered, and the arresting thesis
of an absent bourgeois class – “one finds in China neither a triumphant bourgeoisie,
nor  indeed  any  kind  of  bourgeoisie”  (p.  133)  –  is  as  cogent  as  it  was  in  Bergère’s
Capitalismes  et  capitalistes  en  Chine  (2007).  The  internal  structure  of  the  CCP is  then
reviewed, together with its strategies of social control and repression that constitute
the  coercive  side  of  party-society  relations  (Chapter  5).  This  is  followed  by  an
exploration  of  the  Party’s  efforts  at  legitimation  –  the  consensual  aspect  of  party-
society  relations  –  with  a  special  emphasis  on  nationalist  mobilisation (Chapter  6).
Chapter 7 moves on to provide a critical survey of recent debates on the existence of a
unique “model” of development with Chinese characteristics. Joshua Ramo’s oft-cited
“Beijing Consensus,” launched in 2004, is increasingly out of fashion, replaced by the
“China Model,” or 中国模式, which has been the object of a flurry of publications in the
PRC in recent years. It is unmistakably a more nationalist construct than the Beijing
Consensus,  and  it  is  often  accompanied  by  a  rhetoric  of  identity.  Bergère’s  work
Marie-Claire Bergère, Chine: le nouveau capitalisme d'État (China: The New St...
China Perspectives, 2013/4 | 2013
2
concludes  with  a  chapter  examining  possible  scenarios  for  the  medium  term.
Reasserting the “institutional  agility” of  the regime (p.  283),  Bergère predicts,  with
warranted circumspection, an “evolution” – as opposed to a breakdown – of the state-
capitalist status quo.
6 Chine: le nouveau capitalisme d’État thus purports to be a panoramic enquiry into Chinese
authoritarianism’s  multiple  facets  today.  Although the author,  a  historian by trade,
offers some penetrating insights derived from her past scholarship on the merchant
strata in late Qing and Republican China, these remain quite short and peripheral. In
terms of  sources,  Bergère  relies  in  large  part  on  a  vast  collection  of  news  articles
(notably  from the New York  Times),  together  with a  number of  secondary academic
references  (including  the  works  of  Barry  Naughton,  Nicholas  Lardy,  and  Huang
Yasheng).  Prospective readers should be warned, however,  of the relative dearth of
first-hand material and analysis in the book.
7 Another note of warning should be made regarding Chine: le nouveau capitalisme d’État.
This is not the most accomplished work of its author on the theoretical level, to say the
least.  Rather,  it  appears  that  a  conscious  choice  was  made  to  put  readability  over
conceptual elaboration, with the aim of reaching out to a larger public.  On its own
terms, this is a success. Packed with information as it is, the book is a pleasant read,
thanks in part to the author’s trenchant prose style. A non-specialist reader eager to
know more about a subject of such pressing relevance would be very well-advised to
peruse it.
8 The same cannot be said, however, for those who were hoping for Marie-Claire Bergère
to throw new conceptual light on an issue that remains bitterly under-theorised in
China Studies. The expression “state capitalism,” cited throughout, is never properly
defined. As a result, it remains little more than a catchword, and vague and overworn
at that. The very notion of “capitalism” would have deserved a better treatment. Thus
we are told that “capitalism has never been the dominant form of the reformed Chinese
economy” (p. 102), an assertion that will be difficult to gauge for anyone who is not
familiar with Bergère’s past scholarship, in particular Capitalismes et Capitalistes en Chine.
9 In addition to semantic issues of this kind, a minor confusion concerning the public-
private  nexus  in  the  Chinese  economy  is  apparent.  The  author  seems  to  oscillate
between  two  incompatible  approaches.  On  the  one  hand,  a  static,  dichotomistic
perspective is implicit in the expression “mixed economy,” which crops up multiple
times, as well as in the rather hasty assertion that Huawei, the telecoms equipment
giant founded by Ren Zhengfei, is “a fake private firm” (p. 77). On the other hand, this
dualistic  depiction  of  the  public-private  conundrum  is  fortunately  debunked  by
Bergère herself only two pages later: “Let us abandon, for a time, our Cartesian logic
[…] in China, not being public does not necessarily mean being private […]” (p. 79); and
also:  “Chinese  capitalism  is  characterised  by  […]  the  tangling  of  statuses  and  the
overlapping  of  categories.”  This  last  passage  evinces  the  acuity  and  subtlety  that
Bergère has demonstrated so many times in her past research. One has therefore all the
more reason to regret that she does not here attempt to explore the implications of
being “public” and “private” in the Chinese context.
10 On a  more  trivial  note,  one  finds  a  handful  of  inaccuracies  that  should  have  been
prevented by less sloppy editorial work. To provide an example: it is written that “the
grey economy […] may represent RMB 9.3 billion ($1.47 billion) as of 2010.” A reference
is made to TheNew York Times, but the proper source is surely the report produced by
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Wang Xiaolu for Crédit Suisse in 2010, which estimated the grey economy at RMB 9.3
trillion in 2008 – about 30 per cent of the Chinese GDP.2 Or this straightforward blunder:
that the CCP was founded in 1921 in the former French concession of Beijing (p. 184).
11 Such weaknesses, most of them minor, should not detract from the overall quality of
Marie-Claire  Bergère’s  latest  work.  The  book  is  highly  informative  and  elegantly
written;  it  addresses a topic of  crucial  relevance;  and it  comes from a scholar with
tremendous research experience on the Chinese economy.
12 As this book review is being written, current events seem to be moving fast on the front
of China’s “state capitalism.” The fifth generation of Chinese leadership took over the
organs of government last March, and advocates of a new wave of economic reform are
harbouring high hopes of liberalisation in view of the third plenum of the CCP Central
Committee scheduled for this autumn. Last year, the oft-mentioned report China 2030,
co-written  by  the  World  Bank  and  the  Development  Research  Centre  of  the  State
Council, called for a deregulation of the financial sector together with a privatisation of
state  assets.  A  few  Pekinologists  believe  that  Li  Keqiang  is  eager  to  push  forward
implementation of this report.  We might soon be able to tell  whether the so-called
“state capitalism” of the PRC has passed its peak.
NOTES
1.  The State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, in Chinese 国务院国有
资产监督管理委员会 or 国资委.
2.  Wang Xiaolu, “Analysing Chinese grey income,” Crédit Suisse, 2010.
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